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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND,
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ANDERSON and
HANS P. ANDERSON,
Defendants and Appellants,
and RICHARD PETERSON,
.
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
Cross-Claimant, Respondent
and Cross-Appelllant,
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners,
doing business in the firm name and
style of VALLEY CAR MARKET,
·
Defendants and
Cross-Appellants.
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Defendants and Cross-Appellants Brief
CLAYTON E. NIELSEN AND RAY BITTERS
Case No. 7691
BULLEN & OLSON,
Thatcher Building
Logan, Utah
Attorneys for CrossAppellants, Nielsen
·and Bitters.
Hon . .Lewis Jones, Judge
I

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for the County of
Cache.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving·
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND,
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ANDERSON and
HANS .P. ANDERSON,
Defendants and Appellants,
and RICHARD PETERSON,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
Cross.-Claimant, Respondent
and Cross-Appelllant,
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners,
doing business in the firm name and
style of VALLEY CAR MARKET,
Defendants and
Cross-Appellants.
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS
CLAYTON E. NIELSEN AND RAY BITTERS
Case No. 7691
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by Nathan Seamons for
a money judgment against the defendants, Andersons,
upon a conditional sales contract covering a 1948
Mercury and for the foreclosure of said contract. Richard
Peterson was joined as a party defendant. He had been
the prior owner of said .autol!lobile and wrongfully held
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the certificate of title to it. Ray Bitters; doing business
as Valley Car Market, and his employee, Clayton E.
Nielsen, were also joined as defendants. They had aqted.
as the middlemen in the sale of the automobile from the
defendant, Peterson, to the defendant, Larry D. Anderson.
The defendant, Richard Peterson, in his pleadings,
answered the plaintiff's complaint and also filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff and a cross-complaint against
the defendants, Nielsen and Bitters, asking that the
~fercury be delivered up to him or that he have a money
judgment in the sum of $550.00, which he claimed was
due him by the plaintiff, Seamons, and the defendants,
Nielsen and Bitters. He asked for no relief against the
Andersons at the outset, but later made a claim against
them. The defendants, Andersons, filed an answer to
the plaintiff's complaint and a cross-complaint against
Nielsen and Bitters asking for a money judgment against
them. No relief was granted the Andersons on this prayer
against Nielsen and Bitters, and although the defendants,
Andersons, assigned this an error (Point No.7, Page 121)
in their Statement of Points relied upon by the appellants
on appeal, this assignment of error and portion of the
appeal was later waived by the Andersons (Tr. 349), and
is not now before this Court.
The facts of this case began in April, 1949, when the
defendant, Peterson, first approached- the defendant,
Nielsen, at the Valley Car Market, and requested them
to sell his 1948 Mercury (Tr. 8, 9, 247). Nielsen was an
employee of Valley Car Market, owned and operated by
Bitters ( Tr. 300, 301, Exhibit B1). Peterson expressed a
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desire to receive $1950.00 for the car, and Valley was to
receive a commission over and above said sum (Tr. 42,
248, 266). The Mercury was delivered to the Valley Car
Market for Valley to sell for Peterson, and later on the
defendant, Larry Anderson, turned up as a prospective
purchaser ( Tr. 9, 188). Nielsen informed Anderson that
the price of the Mercury was $2095.00 (Tr. 189), and
Larry Anderson asked Nielsen about trading in a 1938
Packard. Nielsen told Anderson that he would .have to
clear this with Peterson, which he did (Tr. 9, 27, 189,
259). The agreement arrived at between Anderson and
Peterson, through the Valley Car Market, was that the
purchase price for the Mercury was to be $2095.00, payable by the Andersons by a trade-in allowance on the 1938
Packard of $425.00, $1400.00 to be secured through finance and a balance of $270.00 in cash by June 1st.
( $425.00 plus $1400.00 plus $270.00 equals $2095.00 ).
Of this, Peterson was to receive $1950.00 _and Valley Car
$145.00. This agreement was entered into on April 25,
1949. (Defendant Peterson's Exhibit No. 1, Tr. 10, 211).
The $270.00 was represented by a post-dated check (for
some reason made out in the sum of $267.00). In brief,
the total consideration passing was $2095.00, broken down
as follows: $1400.00 from finance, $425.00 on the Packard
and $270.00 by a post-dated check ( Tr. 211), Peterson to
get $1950.00 and Valley Car $145.00.
The Packard automobile, valued at $425.00, was delivered by And~rson as part of the purchase price and left
with Valley Car Market by Peterson to be sold for him
( Tr.· 286, 46, 47, 49).
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The $1400.00 was secured from the Commercial
Credit Corporation, through the plaintiff, and it was in
connection with this financing transaction that the defendants, Andersons, executed the conditional sales contract upon which the plaintiff commenced this action. Of
the said $1400.00, the sum of $1300.00 was paid to Richard
Petersoit, and $100.00 was retained by Valley Car Market
as part of its commission ( Tr. 249, 288).
As to the $267.00 check, $150.00 was paid on this
check by Larry Anderson on May 6, 1949, of which sum
$100.00 was paid to Peterson sometime later in May and
$50.00 retained by Valley Car Market upon their commission (Tr. 289, 262). Later on, this $267.00 check was
turned over to Peterson with the sum of $117.00 remaining
unpaid on it by the Andersons ( Tr. 212, 249, 72). The
reason the check was kept by Nielsen and not delivered
to Peterson sooner was that Peterson was out of the area
so much that it was more convenient to have Anderson
make the payments, such as the $150.00 payment on it,
to Nielsen (Tr. 77.)
Therefore, on this original transaction, Peterson received $1300.00 of the finance money, $425.00 by the
trade-in of the Packard, and $100.00 on the post-dated
check, and has coming the sum of $117.00 from Anderson
on the post-dated check. The Valley Car Market received
$100.00 of the finance money and $50.00 of the payment
made on the post-dated check. The total of this consideration equals $2095.00, (less $3.00 to be accounted for
because the post-dated check was made for $267.00 instead of $270.00) of which $1945.00 went to Peterson's
and $150.00 to Valley Car Market's.
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;pursuant ·to a subsequent agreement. wi~h Peterson,
Valley Car Market attempted to sell the 1938 Packard
taken in by Peterson, and finally did sell it to one Darley
for a Chrysler trade-in and $225.00 in cash. Of this
$225.00 in cash Valley paid $108.00 t.o the finance company in an effort to save the Mercury from repossession,
with Peterson's approval ( Tr. 20, 21, 299); the sum of
approximately $65.00 or $75.00 was paid to various concerns in order to put the Packard into a condition to meet
inspection requirements at the time of sale, (Tr. 45, 46,
47, 299 and defendants, Nielsen's and Bitters' Exhibits
B3, B4, B5, Findings of Fact No. 8 ), and the balance of
said $225.00, together with the Chrysler, were tendered
to Peterson, who refused them for the reason that he
wanted to wait to see what was going to come of the deal
( Tr. 40, 48, 299). The Trial Court made a finding in his
oral decision (Tr. 344) that the Chrysler automobile belonged to defendant Peterson.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1. That the trial court errored in making and
entering its decree dated April 9, 1951, in awarding the
defendant, counter-claimant and cross-claimant, Richard
Petersonn, judgment against the defendants, Clayton E.
Nielsen and Ray Bitters, jointly and severally, for the
sum of $300.00, and in making and entering any of its
findings of fact or conclusions of law which are in support
of said judgment.
P'oint 2. That the court errored in making and entering its findings that Nielsen and Bitters were partners in
Valley Car Market and in making its finding No. 16 that
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at the -time of the original transaction the Andersons paid
the sum of $100.18 to the other parties.
The Statement of Points relied upon by the defendants, Clayton E. Nielsen and Ray Bitters, as cross-appellants, on file herein (Vol. 1, Tr. on Appeal, Page 132 ),
contains fourteen points most of which said points allege
that the court committed error in making certain findings
of fact and conclusions of law, resulting in an erroneous
judgment against the cross-appellants, Nielsen and Bitters,
as stated in Point No. 1 above. In order to prevent redundency or duplicity in accordance with Rule 75 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, said points are not repeated here, but will be argued under the broad Point
No. 1 hereinabove set forth.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
The cross-appeal of the defendants, Clayton E. Nielsen and Ray Bitters, who are sometimes referred to herein
as Valley Car Market or just Valley, goes only to that
portion of the court's decree wherein the court awarded
the defendant and cross-claimant, Richard Peterson, judgment against Nielsen and Bitters jointly and severally.
We strongly feel that the court's judgment in this respect
is not supported by any evide:r:tce, and that it is in direct
conflic~ with the jury's findings in its advisory verdict,
questions and answers No. 1 and 2, which findings the
court adopted.
The jury's advisory verdict (Vol. 1, Tr. of Record,
Page 76) insofar as the cross-appellants, Nielsen and Bitters, are concerned on appeal, provides as follows:
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"1. Did Richard Peterson ev~r authorize the Valley
Market or Clayton Nielsento sell and deliver the Mercury
car in question to Larry D. and H. P. Anderson? (Answer
"yes" or "no.")
ANSvVER: Yes.
2. Was Richard Petersen, by agreement with the
Valley Car Market, to receive $1950 for his ~1ercury regardless of what the .Packard sold for from said Valley
Car Market? (Answer "yes" or "no.")
ANSWER: No.

The defendant, Peterson, in all of his pleadings concerning and directed toward the defendants, Nielsen and
Bitters, and in his testimony throughout the trial, attempted to establish the theory that Nielsen and Bitters
were in effect insurers insofar as his $1950.00 was concerned.
He attempted to convince everyone that regardless
of what happened, he was to receive $1950.00 in cash and
that it was Nielsen and Bitters who owed it to him. A
reference to the Transcript of Testimony (fr. 247, 264)
will show that at the outset, Nielsen told Peterson that
Valley· could not buy the Mercury, but that they would
attempt to sell it for him. Later on, when the Packard had
been turned in to Peterson as part of th~ consideration for
the Mercury, N:ielsen again told Peterson that Valley could
not~purchase the Packard, but that they would try to sell
it for him (Tr. 286). Notwithstanding this early understanding, Peterson continued to maintain that it was
Nielsen and Bitters who o\\red him the money for the
Mercury (Tr. 263, 264, 265, 266).
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A reference to the jury's advisory verdict, question
and ansfer No 2, leaves little doubt in ones mind that the
jury rejected this theory, for the jury specifically found
that Peterson was not to receive $1950.00 in cash regardless of what the Packard sold for.
There is only one logical interpretation to place on
this jury finding: That the sale from Peterson to Anderson
through Valley was not a cash transaction for $2095.00,
but that Peterson agreed to take the Packard trade-in plus
cash for his Mercury. In other words, the Packard was
part of the consideration which Peterson agreed to take,
and when Anderson delivered it, Peterson received the
equivalent of $425.00 cash.
Associating this with the jury's answer to question No.
1, we must conclude that the jury found that Peterson
was aware of the terms of the agreement between Valley
and Anderson and that he acquiesced in the same. These
terms were as stated in the written contract between
Valley and Andersons, dated April 25, 1949, (Defendant
Peterson's Exhibit No. 1 ) which it is important to note,
Peterson had in his possession and introduced into evidence at the trial, this contract provided that Anderson
was to pay for the Mercury by trading in his 1938 Packard
at a value of $425.00, by securing $1400 from the finance
company and by making a deferred payment of $270.00,
which is obviously represented by the $267.00 check
signed by Larry Anderson, delivered to Valley and in tum
delivered to Peterson, who had it in his possession and
who introduced it into evidence as his Exhibit No. 4.
The evidence clearly brings out that insofar as Peterson and Valley Car were concerned, there were two sepSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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arate arrangements. The first: The arrangeme~t whereby
Peterson agreed with Valley to have Valley sell his 1948
Mercury to Anderson. The second: The arrangement
whereby Peterson agreed with Valley to have Valley sell
Peterson's 1938 Packard, which he had taken in from
Anderson on the Mercury.
The evidence shows that the first transaction was
complete with one exception to be mentioned when Larry
Anderson produced $2095.00 worth of consideration by
securing $~400.00 from finance, $425.00 on a trade-in of
the Packard and $270.00 by a promise to pay in the future.
The exception referred to is the fact that Anderson still
_owes $117.00 on the last-named item, since he only paid
$150.00 on the deferred payment represented by the
$267.00 post-dated check. The jury agreed with this
theory in answering question No. 2.
Under no possible juggling of the facts can Peterson
or the lower court make a valid finding supported by evidence that on this first transaction there is anything due
from Nielsen and Bitters or Valley to Peterson. The only
sum remaining due is the sum of $117.00 on the postdate~ check and there is no doubt in anyone's mind but
that this is due from Anderson to Peterson and not from
Nielsen, Bitters or Valley to Peterson. Peterson realized
this during the trial, and made a belated effort to salvage
something by amending his prayer to ask for a judgment
against the Andersons:
Thus, if there is any sum due from Nielsen, Bitters
or Valley to Peterson, it must be by reason of the second
arrangement, i.e., the sale of the 1938 Packard for Peter-
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son. Nielsen testified during his examination that there
was approximately the sum of $52.00 due and owing to
Peterson by Valley Car ~larket. Actually, when all of the
figures were totaled, said sum was $41.49, as will be shown
below. The Packard sold to one Darley for a Chrysler
trade-in and $225.00 cash. There is no question as to the
Chrysler since it still was available at the trial, and the
Court, at the time it made its oral decision, made a finding
that the Chrysler automobile did belong to Peterson
( Tr. 344). Nielsen testified that this Chrysler was available to Peterson but that Peterson never bothered to do
anything about it. Peterson never denied this. As to the
$225.00 cash, $108.00 was paid to the Finance company,
with Peterson's approval, to save the Mercury from repossession ( Tr. 20, 21, 299). Peterson never denied this.
Further sums were expended by Valley to put the Packard
in a condition to pass inspection so that it could be sold.
These sums are evidenced by the defendants, Nielsen's
and Bitters' Exhibit B3, B4 and B5, representing $13.56
paid to Hopkins Auto Parts, $13.05 to Russells Incorporated, and $48.90 paid to Seamons and Loveland. These
repair items total $75.51, and the Court, in its findings of
fact No. 8, founa these expenditures to have been made.
If we add the $108.00 paid to finance to the $75.51 paid
for fixing the Packard, we have a total of $183.51. If we
deduct this from the $225.00 cash received on the Packard,
we have a balance of $41.49 which Valley Car Market
owes to defendant, Peterson. This, of course, was tendered to Peterson, who refused to accept it for the reason
that he wanted to wait to see what was going to come of
the deal ( Tr. 4~; 299 ) .
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It therefore appears that Valley owes Peterson said
sum of $41.49, which Valley has always been willing to
pay. If Valley owes Peterson any more, it is the sum of
$5.00, due to the fact that from the original consideration
on the Mercury, Peterson received only $1945.00 instead
of $1950.00, and Valley received $150.00 as commission
instead of $145.00. This is brought out more fully in the
recapitulation which is made a part of this brief and follows hereafter.
The total of these two sums, $41.49, plus $5.00, falls
far short of the $300.00 which the Court awarded Peterson
in his judgment against Nielsen, Bitters and Valley.
When the eviqence is read and analized, we strongly
feel that it amply supports the theory of the case above
presented and that the evidence in no way supports the
Court's finding and conclusion that Nielsen and Bitters
owe Peterson $300.00.
If we accept the theory of the defendant, Peterson,
as adopted by the Court, then we must completely igno~e
the findings of the jury as represented by question and
answer No. 2 of the advisory verdict. We must further
adopt the theory that Nielsen, Bitters and Valley Car
M;arket were not merely agents of Peterson in selling
the various automobiles but that they were insurers,
guaranteeing under any and all circumstances that the
cars would sell for certain prices. We think that the
evidence shows that Nielsen contacted Peterson througout
the period of time of the various arrangements to secure
his suggestions and authority before taking action.
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On the other hand, we further feel that ~1r. Peterson's
testimony indicates that he adopted a very careless manner during all of said time, knowing full well what was
going on, but failing to do anything to change it. Particular reference is made to the Transcript of Testimony,
pages 263 through 266, which strongly indicates that
Peterson was ·attempting to hold Nielsen for the purchase
price of the car even though Peterson had previously
testified that Nielsen had told him that Valley could not
purchase the car but could merely act as a selling agency,
and even though Pet~rson had approved the sale to Anderson. In other words, Peterson refused to accept any of
his responsibilities, and then attempte<:l to circumvent his
carelessness and negligence by putting all of the burden
on someone else where it did not ·belong.
It is further interesting to note, as the evidence unfolds itself, that no where along the line did Peterson
assert any authority or ownership of the Mercury, whether
during his conversation with Anderson after Anderson
had bought it, or in his later conversation with Nielsen or
Seamons. He knew he had sold the car, and that Anderson had paid everything for it except the $117.00. It was
not until long afterwards, when the controversy arose,
that he commenced to claim, apparently as an afterthought, that he was the owner of the Mercury.
It is of furth€r importance to note that no where in
Peterson's testimony does he assert that Nielsen acted
beyond his authorization as Peterson's agent in any of
the transactions. He does not deny that part of the Packard money was paid on the Mercury payments to save
it from repossession with his authorization, nor did he
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
deny that sums were expended on the Packard in order to
effect. a sale of it after he had told Nielsen to sell it for
the best that he could. He never denied that he was
offered the Chrysler and the net proceeds of the cash
taken in on the sale of the Packard.
In order to summarize the various transactions, there
follows a Recapitulation which sets up the various arrangements between the parties, the considerations involved and their disposition:
RECAPITULATION
By agreement, entered into by Valley and Anderson,
and approved by Peterson, Anderson was to pay $2095.00
for Mercury as follows:
Trade in (Packard)
$ 425.00
Finance (Seamons)
1400.00
Deferred cash payment 270.00
----$2095.00

(For some reason
check was made
out for $267.00)

From the above consideration:
1. Petersen received the Packard, and made an
agreement with Valley to sell it, so he received from
Anderson a consideration of ------------------------------------ $425.00
2. Peterson received $1300.00 from the $1400.00
secured by financing -------------------------------------------- $1300.00

3. Peterson received $100.00 from Anderson as part
payment on the post-dated check ------------------------ $100.00
4. There still remains a balance to be collected on
the check in the sum of $117.00, which is due from
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Anderson to Peterson -------------------------------------------- $117.00
This totals ------------------------------------------------ ____ ____ $1942.00
which is $8.00 less than the $1950.00 agreed upon.
From the above consideration:
1. Valley received $100.00 from the $1400.00
secured. from finance -------------------------------------------·- $100.00
2. Valley received $50.00 from the $150.00
$50.00
paid in on the check ----------·-----------------------------------This totals _______ ___ ________ ______ ______ __ ____ __ ____ __ _______ ___ $150.00
or $5.00 more than the commission Valley was authorized
to receive (all over 1950.00.)
Thus, we see that Anderson owes Petersen $117.00
on the check and $3.00 as the difference between $267.00
and $270.00, and Valley owes Petersen $5.00.
As to the Packard, which was a separate transaction:
It sold for a Chrysler and

$225.00~

1. The Chrysler was available for Petersen, but he
never took it. He authorized its sale in court and it was
sold for $25.00.
2. The $225.00 cash was distributed as follows:
$108.00 to Commercial Credit to protect the Mercury.
(with Petersen;Js sanction. )
13.56 to Hopkins to prepare for inspection.
13.05 to Russells' Inc. to prepare for inspection.
48.90 to Seamons & Loyeland to prepare for in-'
spection. (all with Petersen;Js sanction. )
$183.51 Total
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Which leaves a balance of $41.49 of the $225.00,
which sum Valley tendered to Petersen, who refused it.
Thus, Valley owes Petersen $41.49, and in addition,
the Chrysler automobile belong to Petersen, who authorized its sale in court.
ARGUMENT
Point II
In making its oral decision, the trial Court specifically found that Nielsen and Bitters were operating Valley Car Market as partners ( Tr. 345). In its findings the
Court again found the parties to be partners and entered
a judgment against them jointly and severally.
It is our contention that the evidence conclusively
shows that Bitters was the owner of the car lot and that
Nielsen was his employee. The evidence shows that Bitters started the car lot without Nielsen and that later
Nielsen came to work for him. Later on, Nielsen left
his employment and when Bitters disposed of the lot he
did so as his own property and there never was any claim
by Nielsen that he had any interest in it. There is no
need to go into any lengths on this point since the Transcript of Testimony, pages 300 and 301, together with
Exhibit B1, sets up what the relationship was.
As to the Courfs finding that the Andersons paid the
sum of $100.18 to the other parties at the time of the
original transaction, we are unable to find one bit of evidence in the records substantiating this finding. The only
cash passing at ·the time of the original transaction was
the $1400.00 finance money.
The $100.18 which the Court refers to, is _presumably
the $108.00 which Valley Car paid to the finance company
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on the Mercury payments out of the proceeds on the Packard in order to save the Mercury from repossession.
While this finding is not important, we do raise it
for the reason that we feel the Court's findings are unsubstantiated by the- evidence, and we point this out as one
example among many. Of course, the bulk of the findings
attacked by these cross-appellants go to the court's·finding
that Nielsen and Bitters, as partners, owe Peterson $300.00, which we have argued more fully in Point I above.
CONCLUSION
The veidence does not support the Court's finding
and conclusion that Nielsen and Bitters, jointly and severally, owe Peterson $300.00. On the other hand, the
evidence strongly supports the fact that Nielsen and Bitters owe less than $50.00 to Peterson and that they tendered it to him but he refused to accept it.
We stongly urge the proposition that the evidence
does not support the Courfs findings, and that the judgment against Nielsen and Bitters in the sum of $300 should
be reversed, and that any judgment against Nielsen and
Bitters be limited to the sum of $46.49, which sum Valley
Car has always been willing to pay.
Respectfully submitted,
BULLEN & OLSON
Thatcher Building
Logan, Utah
Attorneys for CrossAppellants, Nielsen
and Bitters.
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